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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL AWARDS: PRESERVING
INDEPENDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The resolution of potential disputes is of great concern to parties
involved in international business transactions. Due to the high cost of
overseas litigation and the uncertainty of relying upon a foreign legal
system, such disputes are often difficult to resolve.' It is essential to the
maintenance of international trade relationships that businesses feel
confident in the methods by which they resolve commercial disputes.2
Arbitration agreements allay many of the concerns relating to
international business by ensuring a degree of organization and
predictability in the process through which disputes are resolved.'
Accordingly, international businesses frequently enter into arbitration
agreements that pre-arrange the procedures to be followed in the event
that a dispute arises. Establishing a process of dispute resolution in
advance helps to create a "neutral playing field," increasing the parties'
comfort level and promoting future involvement in international
commercial transactions.'
In long-term commercial relationships, the details of an agreement to
arbitrate, including the applicable law, standards, and procedures to be
followed, are generally established in the initial contract between the
parties. Ironically, the contractual nature of international arbitration
brings about many drawbacks. Although the possibility of an arbitrator
abusing an unchecked process may jeopardize its integrity, interference
in a private agreement is contrary to the fundamental goals of interna-
tional arbitration. As noted by one commentator, "the effectiveness of
international commercial arbitration depends on the predictable
enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards."'
1. Ginger Lew & Jean Heilman Grier, Essay: The Role of International Law in the
Twenty-First Century: A Role For Governments in the Resolution of International Private
Commercial Disputes, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1720, 1722-23 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Scherk v. AIberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
4. See William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TuL. L. REV. 647, 656 (1989).
5. Michael F. Hoellering, International Arbitration Under U.S. Law and AAA Rules,
DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1995, at 25.
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International arbitration policies are founded upon two basic
interests: preserving the finality of arbitral awards and maintaining a just
system. 6 Arbitration is a consensual process.7 The contractual nature
of an arbitration permits international companies to pre-arrange a
predictable system of dispute resolution which preserves the privacy of
their business relationship.8 Judicial review undermines the fundamental
benefits of submitting to commercial arbitration.9 The very reasons
parties enter into international arbitration agreements-to increase
speed, neutrality, efficiency, privacy, and finality, and to reduce costs of
dispute resolution'-are rendered void if a national court is permitted
to reexamine the decision of an arbitral panel.
In effect, review systems designed to protect the accuracy of an
arbitration award and ensure legal precision may impede the attainment
of "justice" through delay by eroding "confidence in the efficiency and
fairness of the system."" Under a judicial system of control, increased
costs in time and money are passed onto parties who selected arbitration
as a way to protect their rights.2 Ultimately, such parties are denied
the protections they sought through arbitration and possibly priced out
of the system altogether. 3
Nevertheless, there are dangers inherent in the complete indepen-
dence of arbitral forums. A forum with no system of review is more
susceptible to abuse. 4 For example, arbitrators in an unchecked system
may be more tempted to exceed the terms of an arbitration agreement
or to ignore customary policy considerations," resulting in an arbitrary
decision. 6 Arguably, such a system empowers arbitrators with the
6. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICA-
TION AND ARBITRATION 5 (1992) [hereinafter REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL]. Reisman
argues that these competing interests are reflected in a Roman maxim which argues that "the
public interest requires that there be an end to disputes," and a quote from Abraham Lincoln,
stating that "'nothing is final until it's right."' Id
7. W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration,
1989 DUKE L.J 739, 745 (1989) [hereinafter Reisman, ICSID Arbitration].
8. Id. at 746.
9. REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL, supra note 6, at 6.
10. See Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in
the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685, 1687
(1983). See also Reisman, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 7, at 747.
11. Reisman, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 7, at 744.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 746.
15. Park, supra note 4, at 653.
16. Reisman, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 7, at 743.
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ability to violate the terms of an arbitration agreement. Parties may lose
confidence in a system in which they suffer unremedied breaches of their
agreements. If the system of international arbitration is to continue to
meet the needs of international business, it is necessary to reach a
balance between the conflicting goals of justice and finality in commer-
cial arbitration."
This Comment will set forth the current standards for review of
international arbitral awards and discuss the status of their application.
Next, it will assess the implications of a national system of judicial review
on the role the United States plays in international trade. Finally, this
Comment will discuss the criticisms and potential misapplication of the
current standards of review.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
The primary issue facing the system of international arbitration
concerns the review of arbitral awards. Since there is no institutional
system of review, aggrieved parties are forced to appeal arbitrators'
decisions in national courts. Although judicial review has been limited
somewhat by statute and international accord,"8 standards do exist by
which United States courts may refuse to enforce an award.'
United States courts have repeatedly emphasized a strong public
policy favoring international arbitration.' Accordingly, the role of
domestic judicial systems is limited. There is no review of an arbitrator's
substantive conclusions in rendering an award.21 To subject an award
to review on the merits of the dispute would "destroy the finality for
which the parties contracted and render the exhaustive arbitration
process merely a prelude to the judicial litigation which the parties
sought to avoid."' However, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has held that, notwithstanding the parties' intent to provide for
17. Id. at 744.
18. Office of Supply, Government of the Republic of Korea v. New York Navigation
Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Judicial review has been thus restricted in order to
further the objective of arbitration which is to enable parties to resolve disputes promptly and
inexpensively, without resort to litigation.").
19. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201 and 301 (1995) (codifying the Federal Arbitration Act, the
New York Convention, and the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration).
20. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184.(8th Cir. 1988); Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir. 1975).
21. Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Marketing, S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 1987).
22. Id.
1997]
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a final decision, an arbitral award is subject to statutory defenses
regarding enforcement?23 Unfortunately, questions submitted for review
are frequently intertwined with the substantive issues of a dispute.24
Currently, United States courts review arbitral decisions under both the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards and the Federal Arbitration Act.' Although these exceptions
have been the subject of passing reference in a few Supreme Court
decisions, the scope and validity of their application have yet to be
decided.26
A. The New York Convention
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, which has been incorporated into the United States
Code,27 provides for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in
United States courts.' However, the rules of the Convention permit
refusal of an award under limited circumstances. A number of the
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award are based on deficiencies in
the arbitral process. Specifically, Article V of the New York Convention
provides that:
1. An award may be refused, at the request of the party against
23. Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992); Fotochrome,
517 F.2d at 519. Many courts also apply a common law standard of review based on an
arbitrator's "manifest disregard" of the law. See, e.g., Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935
F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991); Siegel v. Titan Industrial Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892 (2d Cir. 1985)
(per curiam); Blue Bell Inc. v. Western Glove Works Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 236, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). This standard will be discussed in detail in Part III of this Comment.
24. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1986).
25. Craig M. Gertz, Comment, The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International
Commercial Arbitration: A Case for Contractual Depecage, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 163, 181
(1991) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201 (1995)). The Federal Arbitration Act governs all arbitra-
tion proceedings occurring within the United States or otherwise submitted under the Act.
Consequently, many of the cases applying the standards of the Act concern disputes among
domestic parties. Because interpretations made by courts in domestic cases concern the same
statute, the interpretations may also be persuasive in the international context.
26. The Court has failed to adopt even a description of the permissible application of
the exceptions to enforcement. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct.
1920, 1923 (1995) (upholding the binding nature of arbitration agreement and confirming
award); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 656 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (enforcing order to compel arbitration).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1995) [hereinafter the "New York Convention"].
28. Id.; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
Dec. 29,1970, art. V, 21 U.S.T. 2517,2520 (1970) [hereinafter Convention on the Recognition].
The rules of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration provide
for the refusal to recognize an arbitral award under identical circumstances. 9 U.S.C. § 301
art. 5.
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which it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof
that:
(a) The parties ... [were] under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law...
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice.., or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or
not falling within the scope of the submission to
arbitration...
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of
the parties...
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties. 9
In addition, arbitral awards may also be vacated under less concrete
standards involving the suitability of an issue for arbitration or policy
reasons. Article V of the New York Convention provides that:
2. Recognition of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
authority of the state where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that [country]; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.0
These exceptions are considered by a federal district court when a
party to an arbitration seeks to have the award enforced in the United
States.3' Most of the exceptions under Article V(1) protect both the
integrity of the contract and the fairness of the procedure. 2 These
provisions are relatively clear and cause little dispute. In contrast, the
grounds for refusing to enforce an award under subsections 1(c) and 2(b)
29. New York Convention, supra note 27, at art. V(1); Convention on the Recognition,
supra note 28, art. V(1), at 2520.
30. New York Convention, supra note 27, at art. V(2); Convention on the Recognition,
supra note 28, art. V(2)(a)-(b), at 2520.
31. New York Convention, supra note 27, at art. V(1); Convention on the Recognition,
supra note 28, art. V(1), at 2520.
32. Convention on the Recognition, supra note 28, Art. V(1), at 2520. For example,
article V(1)(b), concerning notice, ensures the protection of due process rights under the
standards of the forum state. Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145 (2d
Cir. 1992) (citing Parsons & Whittlemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 975-76 (2d Cir. 1974)).
1997]
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offer little direction to the courts interpreting them.33 Thus, parties to
an arbitration agreement, who may ultimately be subject to this
provision, are faced with considerable uncertainty. Ironically, uncertainty
is one of the problems parties seek to avoid through the execution of an
arbitration agreement.
1. Excess of Authority
Due to the contractual nature of arbitration, an award must be based
on the provisions of the agreement, rather than an arbitrator's personal
interpretation of legislative requirements. 34 If an arbitrator fails to
confine his or her decision to the provisions of the agreement, the
arbitrator has exceeded the scope of authority, rendering the award
unenforceable .3  However, it is often difficult to distinguish between a
mere error of law and an action which wholly exceeds arbitral authori-
ty.36 Thus, a court risks imposing its own substantive evaluation of a
dispute in reviewing the scope of an arbitrator's authority.37 The
burden of showing an arbitral tribunal has exceeded its contractual
authority falls on the party challenging confirmation of the award. 8
The strength of the public policy favoring international arbitration
renders this burden difficult to overcome.
39
2. Public Policy
A reviewing court may also vacate an award that it finds contrary to
domestic public policy.' Article V(2)(b), which permits review under
this standard,4' is to be construed narrowly due to the strong policy in
favor of international arbitration.412 However, review under this "catch-
all" standard is somewhat troublesome.43 The court in Fotochrome Inc.
33. Convention on the Recognition, supra note 28, art.V (1)-(2), at 2520.
34. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) (reviewing arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement).
35. Id. See infra Part II(B)(2) of this Comment for a discussion of the standard of excess
of authority under the Federal Arbitration Act.
36. Park, supra note 4, at 675.
37. Id.
38. Ministery of Defense of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 1992).
39. Id.
40. Convention on the Recognition, supra note 28, art. V(2)(b), at 2520. See W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers of
America, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (enforcing an arbitral award pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement); Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copol Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975).
41. Convention on the Recognition, supra note 28, art. V(2)(b), at 2520.
42. Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516.
43. See Park, supra note 4, at 677-79, 682.
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v. Copal Co.' found the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b)
of the New York Convention difficult to apply, observing that "[t]he
legislative history of the provision offers no certain guidelines to its
construction."'45 As a result, the court limited its application of this
provision to circumstances in which recognizing the award would violate
fundamental conceptions of "morality and justice."'
More recently, the Supreme Court offered insight into the direction
it may take in applying the public policy exception. In W.R. Grace v.
Local 759,47 the dispute involved an arbitration award issued pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement. Although the New York Conven-
tion was not applicable, the Court applied a general policy standard to
the award, holding that in the context of labor arbitration, an award
must be contrary to an explicit, overriding policy in order to justify a
refusal to enforce an award.48 Moreover, the Court explained that
under this test, the policy must be "well defined and dominant" and
derive from "reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general consideration of supposed public interests."49 While the Court's
explanation offers some clarity regarding the requisite strength of the
policy, it is troublesome in the arena of international commercial
arbitration, where the dominant public policy is arbitration itself.
In Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation,"0 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that to require a judicial determi-
nation of the existence and the significance of inconsistencies in policy
"would render the allegedly simple and speedy remedy of arbitration a
44. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 516 (quoting Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d at 973 (2d Cir. 1974)).
46. Id. (citing Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974).
47. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
48. ALa at 766. The Court's statements in this case are not binding in all instances of
arbitration, however, because the circumstances surrounding arbitration under a collective
bargaining agreement are unique, varying a great deal from those arising in the international
context. For example, the primary goals of arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement
are to reduce the potential for a strike and to protect employees against discrimination and
unfair labor practices. These issues have widespread consequences and are governed by
independent federal law. Conversely, international commercial arbitration involves the
resolution of individual, private disputes arising out of business transactions, where policy
dictates the promotion of international trade. See Lew & Grier, supra note 1, at 1722-23.
49. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66
(1945)).
50. 737 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984).
1997]
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mockery.""1  Moreover, one commentator characterized the public
policy exception to enforcement as an "escape hatch," under which a
court may interject "national bias and political undertones" into its
assessment of the award. 2 Consideration of policy issues could
threaten the viability of international arbitration as a mechanism for
commercial dispute resolution. 3 At a minimum, it would compromise
the neutrality of the proceeding, frustrating the fundamental goals and
intentions of the parties.
5 4
B. Federal Arbitration Act
When determining whether to vacate an arbitral award, a reviewing
court may also consider the Federal Arbitration Act.5 Under this Act,
enforcement of an award may be refused if: (1) the award was procured
through fraud or corruption, (2) the arbitrators were biased, (3) the
arbitrators engaged in misconduct resulting in prejudice against the rights
of any party, or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their authority.6 There is
a heavy burden upon a party invoking one or more of these defenses to
exhibit that the standards required for denying recognition have been
met.57
1. Uncommon Grounds for Vacating an Arbitral Award
The first three grounds for vacating an arbitration award under the
Federal Arbitration Act are rarely invoked by parties to an arbitration
agreement. Accordingly, there is little guidance available in the form of
judicial interpretation concerning the application of these statutory
provisions. The nature of these standards, however, enables them to be
assessed independently from an arbitral award.
51. Id. at 153. The policies at issue in this case involved fraud and the standards of proof
underlying the arbitral award. Id. at 151. The court emphasized that to refuse confirmation
of the award under the circumstances of the case would open the door to progressive emascu-
lation of the Convention, which "'was intended to remove obstacles to confirmation, not to
create them."' Id. at 153.
52. Paul D. Tutun, Note, Arbitration Procedures in the United States-German Income Tax
Treaty: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in International Tax Disputes, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J.
179, 204 (1994).
53. Id
54. Id at 203-04.
55. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
56. Id. § 10.
57. Blue Bell Inc. v. Western Glove Works Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 236,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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2. Excess of Authority
Review of an award based on an alleged abuse of authority is quite
limited. 8 The excess-of-powers provision of the Federal Arbitration
Act § 10(d) is afforded an extremely narrow interpretation. 9 Courts
apply a particularly narrow reading of this provision where a dispute
arises from an arbitrator's decision on an issue that was properly
submitted to the tribunal.60
An arbitrator's authority derives solely from the contract between the
parties to the arbitration.61 Accordingly, an arbitrator must act within
the boundaries of his or her power under an arbitration agreement.62
If an arbitral decision includes rulings on issues not presented to the
tribunal or otherwise authorized, the arbitrator has exceeded her
authority and the award may be vacated.63 This standard has been
characterized as a "Pandora's box" due to the fine line between an
arbitrator who has simply rendered a "bad decision," and one who has
failed to respect the terms of an arbitration agreement.'
Courts have consistently held that awards supported by any
"colorable justification" must be enforced.65  Thus, where arbitrators
explain the basis of their conclusions, even where the award is barely
justifiable, enforcement cannot be refused.' An arbitrator, however,
must act within the confines of the contract authorizing arbitration.67
While the arbitrator may interpret any ambiguity in the contract
language, he or she may not disregard or alter unambiguous provi-
sions.' Conversely, Blue Bell v. Western Glove Works69 emphasized
58. See infra Part II(A)(1) of this Comment for a discussion of the excess of powers
standard under the New York Convention.
59. See Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1991); Blue Bell,
816 F. Supp. at 240 (citations omitted); Mobil Oil Indonesia Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia)
Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 63, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
60. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 515.
61. Blue Bell, 816 F.2d at 240. The consensual nature of arbitral jurisdiction is central
to the system of international arbitration and it is critical that a reviewing court preserve the
parties' autonomy. Id.
62. ld.
63. Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 515 (citations omitted).
64. Park, supra note 4, at 698.
65. See Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 516; Blue Bell, 816 F. Supp. at 240; Mobil Oil Indonesia,
Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia) Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 63, 65 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
66. Mobil Oil, 487 F. Supp. at 65 (quoting Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich &
Co., 579 F.2d 691, 703 (2d Cir. 1978)).
67. See Convention on the Recognition, supra note 28, art. V(1)(a)-(c), at 2520.
68. Inter-City Gas v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1988).
1997]
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the importance of maintaining the consensual nature of arbitral
jurisdiction, holding that "a purported award which is accomplished in
ways inconsistent with the shared contractual expectations of the parties
is something to which they had not agreed."7 The court went on to
explain the necessity of maintaining control over an arbitrator's exercise
of power, stating:
Without [exces de pouvior],71 arbitration would lose its character
of restrictive delegation and the arbitrator would become a
decision maker with virtually absolute discretion; whatever limits
may have been prescribed by the parties would become meaning-
less because the arbitrator would be answerable effectively to no
one. Exces de pouvior thus is the conceptual foundation of
control for arbitration.72
Nonetheless, the court stressed that the limitation on an- arbitrator's
exercise of authority is not intended to permit a dissatisfied party to
destroy the result of a consensual arbitration proceeding, but rather to
confine an arbitrator's decision to issues submitted to the tribunal.73
III. THE COMMON LAW STANDARD OF MANIFEST DISREGARD
In addition to the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitral award,
many courts have adopted the common law standard of "manifest
disregard."'74 The standard derives from dicta contained in the 1953
Supreme Court case of Wilko v. Swann.75 In Wilko, the Court invali-
dated an arbitration agreement on the grounds that the dispute arose
under the Securities Act and that congressional intent was better served
by prohibiting arbitration of a securities issue.76 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court reasoned that "[i]n unrestricted submissions, such as the
present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
69. 816 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
70. Id. at 240 (quoting Reisman, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 7, at 745).
71. Exces de pouvier is a Latin phrase describing the Roman Law doctrine of excess of
powers. Reisman, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 7, at 745.
72. Blue Bell, 816 F. Supp. at 240 (quoting Reisman, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 7,
at 745).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512,515 (2d Cir. 1991); Siegel
v. Titan Industrial Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985); Blue Bell Inc. v. Western Glove
Works Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 236, 242 ( S.D.N.Y. 1993).
75. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
76. Id. at 438.
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federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation., 77
A. Validity of the Standard
In the years following the Wilko decision, a number of courts
referred to the Wilko Court's comments, applying the manifest disregard
language as an additional standard by which to assess arbitral awards.78
However, discussions of this standard have been inconsistent. For
example, in his dissenting opinion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth,9 Justice Stevens asserted that manifest disregard is
the only standard of review for arbitration awards.8" In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Stevens apparently ignored the statutory provisions
of the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act.
Conversely, the Court in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of
America,8 which was decided shortly after Wilko, implied a different
approach to the review of arbitral awards. In its discussion of the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the Court made a number of
statements that highlight the difficulty in applying the standard of
manifest disregard,' suggesting the Court's reluctance to accept the
standard. For example, the Court stated that an arbitrator's erroneous
construction of an arbitration contract is not subject to judicial review.'
In addition, the Court asserted that arbitrators are not required to
disclose the reasoning behind their decisions, and that they may "draw
on their personal knowledge" in deciding the issues presented to
them.84
B. Application of the Doctrine
Unfortunately, the boundaries of the common law standard have
77. Id. at 436.
78. See Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at 516; Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Carte
Blanche Int'l Ltd., 888 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1989); Siegel, 779 F.2d at 893; Blue Bell, 816 F.
Supp. at 242.
79. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
80. IL at 656 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115
S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995).
81. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
82. IL at 203 n.4. In Is Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir. 1974), the court interpreted the comments of the Court in Bernhardt as negating the
application of a non-statutory standard of review to cases based upon the construction of a
contract, such as that of an arbitration clause. Id at 431.
83. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203 n.4 (citations omitted).
84. Id.
1997]
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never been clearly defined. 5 Rather, courts adopting the standard of
manifest disregard have described its proper application with language
equally as vague as the term itself. For example, the court in Siegel v.
Titan Industrial Corp.16 characterized the standard as "something
beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part
of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law."'
Court have also attempted to describe the circumstances in which the
standard has been met, permitting the refusal to enforce an award where
an arbitrator "understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to
ignore it.""8 In Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Carte Blanche
Int'l Ltd.,89 the court characterized the restrictions placed upon a court
applying this test stating, "The governing law alleged to have been
ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable."90 Refusal to enforce an award on the grounds of manifest
disregard, however, is not permitted where an arbitrator has erroneously
applied rules of law or erroneously decided the facts of a case.91
C. Criticisms of the Manifest Disregard Standard
Several courts have either declined to apply the doctrine of manifest
disregard or criticized its appropriateness.92 In the 1992 case, Ainsworth
v. Skurnick,93 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared that it
had never adopted the standard of manifest disregard as a basis for
refusing an arbitral award, and that to do so would be incorrect under
85. See Siegel, 779 F.2d at 892; Blue Bell, 816 F. Supp. at 242.
86. 779 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1985).
87. Id at 892 (quoting Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978)).
88. Id. at 893 (quoting Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516,
356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973)).
89. 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir 1989).
90. Id at 265 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d
930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986)). The court went on to state that it was not "at liberty to set aside
an arbitration panel's award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or
applicability of laws urged upon it." Id.
91. Siege4 779 F.2d at 892-93 (citing uS Stavborg v. Nat'l Metal Converters, Inc., 500
F.2d 424,432 (2d Cir. 1974)); South East Atlantic Shipping Ltd. v. Garnac Grain Co., Inc., 356
F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1966).
92. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994)
(declining to adopt the standard); Ainsworth v. Skurnich, 960 F.2d 939, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1992)
(declining to adopt the standard); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743
(8th Cir. 1986) (declining to adopt the standard). See also Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412-13 (11th Cir. 1990) (criticizing the standard);
Stavborg, 500 F.2d at 430-31 (criticizing the standard).
93. 960 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1992).
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the law of that circuit.94 Similarly, the court in Raiford v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith95 declined to adopt manifest disregard
as a standard of review. In discussing its reluctance to apply the
standard, the court noted that, "indeed, we have expressed some doubt
as to whether it should be adopted since the standard would likely never
be met when the arbitrator provides no reasons for its award (which is
typically the case). 96
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America, Inc.,9 7 the only
Supreme Court case to consider this topic since Wilko, suggests that
application of a nonstatutory standard of manifest disregard to an
arbitral award would be inappropriate.98 The Court stated that
"[w]hether the arbitrators misconstrued a contract is not open to judicial
review,"99 and that "[arbitrators] may draw on their personal knowledge
in making an award."'" In I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters,
Inc.,01 the court recognized that inconsistencies between Wilko and
Bernhardt and questioned the validity of the manifest disregard
standard.1'2
Recently, the Seventh Circuit expressed strong criticisms of the
manifest disregard standard in Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross,
Inc."0 3 In Baravati, the court asserted that Wilko dicta is "history" and
that permitting application of the standard would enable a disappointed
party to renew his or her dispute by bringing it into court through the
"back door."' ' 4 The court stated:
We can understand neither the need for the formula nor the role
that it plays in judicial review of arbitration (we suspect
none-that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle review for
clear error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire
94. IL at 940-41.
95. 903 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1990).
96. Id. at 1413. Similarly, the court in Stroh Container Co. determined that it was
unnecessary to adopt the standard as an exception to enforcement because the award would
be affirmed regardless. Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 750.
97. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
98. Id. at 203 n.4.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1979).
102. Id. at 431. The dispute in this case arose out of a disagreement regarding the
payment of a shipment made to Spain. Id. The court criticized the manifest disregard
standard and affirmed the district court's holding confirming an arbitral award determined
pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement. Id.
103. 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
104. Id.
1997]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
modem law of arbitration. If it is intended to be synonymous
with the statutory formula that it most nearly resembles-whether
the arbitrators "exceeded their powers"-it is superfluous and
confusing. There is enough confusion in the law.l°5
In addition, the fact that the manifest disregard doctrine has existed since
1953, but was never incorporated into the New York Convention or the
Federal Arbitration Act, suggests that Congress intended to exclude it
as a standard of review for arbitral awards.
IV. PRESERVING INDEPENDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
The United States has a great interest in preserving the viability of
arbitration as a method of commercial dispute resolution. The Supreme
Court has reinforced the national interest in preserving international
trade through frequent reference to the public policy favoring interna-
tional arbitration."°  As a practical matter, this interest cannot be
protected through interference in international arbitration by national
courts, but only through respect of the parties' autonomy in resolving
disputes by arbitration.
A. Acceptance of Arbitration in National Courts
The Supreme Court has endorsed the system of international
arbitration with powerful language, describing the role of arbitration in
ensuring the continued success of United States business in the
international market. For example, the Court stated in Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co."° that "[t]he expansion of American business
and industry will hardly be encouraged, if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be
resolved under our laws and in our courts."'0 8
In Vimar Seguros & Reaseguros, S.A. v. A/V Sky Reefer,"°9 the
105. Id. In a recent holding on who determines the arbitrability of a dispute, the
Supreme Court noted the problems involved in expanding standards of review. The Court
asserted that "it is undesirable to make the law more complicated by proliferating review
standards without good reasons." First Options of Chicago, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1926.
106. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322,
2328-29 (1995) (enforcing arbitration clause); Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974); Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (enforcing forum selection clause).
107. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
108. Id at 9.
109. 115 S.Ct. at 2322.
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Supreme Court expressed the need to recognize parties' consent to
submit to arbitration, stating, "'[a] parochial refusal by the courts of one
country to enforce an international arbitration agreement' would
frustrate 'the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction."''' . This assessment applies equally to the
enforcement of an arbitral award. Parties conducting business in an
international market consent to arbitration for the purpose of ensuring
predictability in the resolution of potential disputes and to avoid the
unfamiliar procedures and laws of a foreign legal system."' Review of
arbitration in national courts destroys these goals as "[r]eliance on the
varying standard of review in national legal systems offers only
inconsistency and the prospect of unfairness ... ,"112 A district court
in New York affirmed this position asserting that "the policy underlying
the Convention, the avoidance of 'the vagaries of foreign law for
international traders' would be defeated by the allowance of multiple
suits.., where the parties have agreed, by contract, to place their
dispute in the hands of an international arbitral panel in a neutral legal
forum."
113
In M/V Sky Reefer, the Supreme Court asserted that "[i]f the United
States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords and have
a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be
most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner
as to violate international agreements.""' 4 The Court reasoned that to
construe international accords in a fashion which would "disparage the
authority or competence of international forums for dispute resolution,"
would be contrary to the purpose of our international agreements."
5
In emphasizing its position, the Court warned that skepticism regarding
the competence of foreign arbitrators "must give way to contemporary
principles of international comity and commercial practice.""16 Con-
versely, in his dissenting opinion in Sky Reefer, Justice Stevens argues
that permitting disputes to be resolved independently in separate forums
110. Id. at 2328 (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516).
111. Stein & Wotman, supra note 10, at 1687.
112. Tutun, supra note 52, at 208.
113. Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y
Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Cooper v. Ateliers De La
Montobecane, S.A., 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (1982)).
114. 115 S. Ct. at 2329. The Court also advised against interpreting international
agreements to "nullify foreign arbitration clauses because of inconvenience to the plaintiff or
insular distrust of the ability of foreign arbitrators to apply the law." It.
115. Id. at 2328.
116. I&
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results in a lack of uniformity."7 Arguably, a lack of uniformity in
dispute resolution could interfere with international trade by increasing
parties' uncertainty."'
Unfortunately, the process of international arbitration is becoming
increasingly "litigation-minded and less conciliation-minded.""n9
Ultimately, reliance on national judicial systems frustrates parties'
expectations of reaching a "neutral and depoliticized resolution of
disputes."'' As one commentator noted, "Judicial enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards against recalcitrant parties unavoid-
ably insinuates into the arbitral process elements of a national legal
system, thus providing the bargained-for non-national arbitration at the
expense of interjecting the peculiarities of the enforcement forum.' 2'
Undoubtedly, an attitude favoring arbitration is imperative in
developing international markets. Encouraging viable alternatives for
the resolution of international commercial disputes is essential in
developing free trade and economic development." Accordingly,
national courts must "shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion." 123
B. Balancing the Interests of Review and Independence
Although it is somewhat unsettling that an arbitrator may taint a
binding decision through fraud, bias, or the exercise of excess authori-
ty,24 a subsequent resort to the judicial system imposes an entirely new
117. Id. at 2331-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens emphasizes the "commercial
interest in uniformity," stating that in particular, "[d]isuniformity in the interpretation of bills
of lading will impair their negotiability." Id. at 2333, 2335.
118. See id at 2331-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A foreign arbitration clause opens a
shipper to "application of unfamiliar and potentially disadvantageous legal standards, until he
can obtain review ... in a domestic forum under the high standard applicable to vacation of
arbitration awards." Id at 2333.
119. Filip De Ly, Current Issues in International Commercial Arbitration: The Place of
Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in
Arbitration Planning, 12 Nw. J. INT'L & BuS. 48, 50 (1991).
120. Tutun, supra note 52, at 192-93 (citation omitted). This results from the dangerous
possibility that a dispute will be submitted to a hostile forum, thereby compromising the
interests of one party. Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
121. Park, supra note 4, at 678.
122. Lew & Grier, supra note 1, at 1721
123. Mitsubishi v. Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638
(1985) (quoting Klukundish Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.
1942)). The Court emphasized that this includes the "customary and understandable
unwillingness to cede jurisdiction" over domestic claims to non-domestic forms. Id.
124. Tutun, supra note 52, at 192. Any system without a hierarchical structure is
susceptible to abuse. REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL, supra note 6, at 6.
[Vol. 80:625
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS
set of concerns onto the process of dispute resolution. The uncertainties
of litigation are precisely what parties to an arbitration agreement seek
to avoid by establishing a procedure for non-judicial dispute resolu-
tion.'" The resolution of international commercial disputes is compli-
cated and expensive."2 Parties to an arbitration agreement attempt to
minimize the disadvantages inherent to potential disputes involving
international business transactions through arbitration, which carries with
it the benefits of speed and cost efficiency. 27 The pressure that
national judicial review places upon the system of arbitration eliminates
these advantages, and the consequence may be a reduction in interna-
tional trade as businesses become discouraged with the system."
In the commercial context, time is often a key concern when a
dispute arises. Thus, the finality of a decision is one of the most
attractive features of the arbitration procedure. Conversely, hierar-
chical layers of protection increase the likelihood of accuracy in an
award."3 Arguably, parties to an arbitration agreement balance
competing interests of justice and finality and make a conscious decision
to invoke the benefits of arbitration. England's House of Lords supports
parties' right to make this choice, holding that "the policy favoring
autonomy of the contracting parties to adopt arbitration as the means of
finally resolving their international disputes prevails over the policy
favoring judicial review of arbitration awards on questions of law."''
Although judicial review may increase the accuracy of arbitration
decisions, the costs of such review is passed on to the parties submitting
to arbitration, thereby negating the benefits of arbitration and undermin-
ing the system altogether. For example, the efficiency and finality of
resolution is eliminated;' the parties are subject to great expense,
potentially excluding them from the opportunity to protect their
interests;. and the nature of the problem becomes public, destroying
125. See Lew & Grier, supra note 1, at 1722-23.
126. De Ly, supra note 119, at 50.
127. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits of
arbitration.
128. Lew & Grier, supra note 1, at 1723.
129. See Reisman, ICSID Arbitration, supra note 7, at 747.
130. REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL, supra note 6, at 4.
131. Stein & Wotman, supra note 10, at 1687 (citation omitted).
132. For example, the eighth circuit noted that review may result in "an opportunity for
serious delay and duplication of effort." Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783
F.2d at 748-49 (8th Cir. 1986).
133. REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL, supra note 6, at 4.
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the aspect of confidentiality." 4 Inflation and rising interest rates
occurring during the review process may also erode the original value of
the award.135 Moreover, parties dissatisfied with the arbitral award
could potentially use the judicial system to harass the other party,
causing additional legal fees and subjecting them to the uncertainty of a
national court decision.
Due to the negative impact that a system of review has on interna-
tional commercial arbitration, review acts as a "roadblock" to its
effectiveness, even as United States courts emphasize the need for
encouraging its development. 136  The United States depends upon
international markets to expand its economy. Accordingly, the possible
unfairness inherent in a lack of judicial review is outweighed by the
national interest in preserving the independence of international
arbitration.
C. Criticisms of the Current Standard for Review
of Arbitral Awards
Notwithstanding the negative effect judicial review has on the
viability of international commercial arbitration, it is unrealistic to
presume that United States courts will permit the standards of review to
disappear altogether. Consequently, it is crucial that the standards be
clarified and narrowed such that parties to arbitration are afforded a
reasonable level of certainty in their expectations. In assessing the
problems surrounding the grounds for vacating arbitral awards, courts
have considered the following issues: the absence of a complete record
upon which to apply the standards, the interconnection of arbitral
procedure with the merits of the dispute, and the possible misapplication
of the standards due to the lack of clarity in their scope.1 37
1. Absence of a Complete Record of Arbitral Proceedings
Arbitrators are not required to disclose the factual basis or reasoning
behind their awards and, unless otherwise specified by the parties, a
134. Stein & Wotman, supra note 10, at 1726.
135. Id. at 1725.
136. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copol Co., 517 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1975). This view was
reinforced in the recent decision Pan Atlantic Group, Inc. v. Republic Insurance Co., 878 F.
Supp. 630, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
137. See, e.g., Stroh, 783 F.2d at 743; Blue Bell, Inc. v. Western Works, Ltd., 816 F. Supp.
236 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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written transcript is unnecessary."8  Consequently, courts are unable
to carry out consistent or meaningful review.39 Where findings and
conclusions of a panel of arbitrators are absent, the court is left to
theorize about to the basis of an award."4 Under these circumstances
it is impossible to review, for example, whether the arbitrator refused to
apply a law of which she .was aware, governing the dispute. Thus,
arbitrators who act in violation of an arbitration agreement may be able
to evade review by issuing awards without a record for a court to
consider.
2. Distinguishing Review of Merits and Procedure
United States courts have consistently maintained that they will not
review the merits of an arbitral award. 4' However, the vague language
of the standards reduces the ability of a court to focus its review on a
specific aspect of the proceeding, even where the court attempts to apply
a narrow scope of review. The court in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi
Industries, Inc.42 noted the difficulty of this task, explaining that issues
of procedure are often intertwined with the merits of the dispute.143
For example, "the line between mere error of law and excess of
authority is unclear, even for a judge, and the judge who attempts to
correct the latter problem rather than the former may in fact be
imposing his own conclusions on the merits of the dispute."'"
3. Potential Misapplication or Expansion of Standards
The lack of definition and clarity available to guide courts in applying
the grounds for vacating an arbitration award, leaves them with
considerable discretion in deciding individual cases. Such broad
discretion leaves open the potential for courts to apply the standards
138. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956) (citations omitted); Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
139. This problem could be remedied by imposing a requirement that arbitrators issue
a complete record of the proceeding and their reasoning. However, such a requirement would
further interfere with the independence of international arbitration.
140. Blue Bell, 816 F. Supp. at 241
141. See, e.g., Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir.
1988).
142. 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986).
143. Id. at 748.
144. Karyn S. Weinberg, Note, Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is "Fair"?
A Study ofLex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 227,251 n.167 (1994).
This problem is particularly prominent with respect to the excess of authority exception. See
Park, supra note 4, at 698 (characterizing this distinction as a "Pandora's Box").
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inconsistently and to expand them where doing so would achieve a
particular purpose.145 Although courts thus far have been reasonably
conservative in their discussions of the standards, the Supreme Court has
yet to address the standards directly.
V. CONCLUSION
The strong policy supporting international arbitration dictates that
courts preserve the independence of arbitral tribunals and effectuate the
intent of parties to finalize their disputes through arbitration. Although
there are dangers inherent in an unchecked system of dispute resolution,
parties to an arbitration agreement are free to balance the costs and
benefits of arbitration and overseas litigation.
The advantages of arbitration in an international commercial context
are strong, eliminating a great deal of cost and uncertainty. Parties
involved in international trade realize the benefit of arranging a neutral,
efficient, and final method of resolving commercial disputes. According-
ly, they voluntarily submit to the arbitral process. It is imperative that
both domestic and foreign parties remain confident in the predictability
and autonomy of international arbitration if the United States is to
continue to develop its international markets. Imposing national review
onto international arbitral awards will only produce skepticism and
reluctance to submit to international commercial arbitration.
JESSICA L. GELANDER
145. The public policy exception under the New York Convention is particularly
susceptible to this sort of manipulation, enabling a court to controvert the parties; intentions
to effectuate its own objectives. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the application of the public policy exception.
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